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Bacillus anthracisBackground: Anthrax is a rare disease in humans but elicits great public fear because of its past use as an agent of
bioterrorism. Injectional anthrax has been occurring sporadically for more than ten years in heroin consumers
across multiple European countries and this outbreak has been difﬁcult to trace back to a source.
Methods:Wetook amolecular epidemiological approach inunderstanding this disease outbreak, includingwhole
genome sequencing of Bacillus anthracis isolates from the anthrax victims. We also screened two large strain re-
positories for closely related strains to provide context to the outbreak.
Findings: Analyzing 60 Bacillus anthracis isolates associatedwith injectional anthrax cases and closely related ref-
erence strains, we identiﬁed 1071 Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs). The synapomorphic SNPs (350)
were used to reconstruct phylogenetic relationships, infer likely epidemiological sources and explore the dynam-
ics of evolving pathogen populations. Injectional anthrax genomes separated into two tight clusters: one group
was exclusively associated with the 2009–10 outbreak and located primarily in Scotland, whereas the second
comprised more recent (2012–13) cases but also a single Norwegian case from 2000.
Interpretation: Genome-based differentiation of injectional anthrax isolates argues for at least two separate dis-
ease events spanning N12 years. The genomic similarity of the two clusters makes it likely that they are caused
by separate contamination events originating from the same geographic region and perhaps the same site of
drugmanufacturing or processing. Pathogen diversity within single patients challenges assumptions concerning
population dynamics of infecting B. anthracis and host defensive barriers for injectional anthrax.
Funding: Thisworkwas supported by the United States Department of Homeland Security grant no. HSHQDC-10-
C-00,139 and via a binational cooperative agreement between the United States Government and the Government
of Germany. This work was supported by funds from the German Ministry of Defense (Sonderforschungsprojekt
25Z1-S-431,214). Support for sequencing was also obtained from Illumina, Inc. These sources had no role in the
data generation or interpretation, and had not role in the manuscript preparation.
Panel 1: Research in Context Systematic Review:We searched PubMed for any article published before Jun. 17, 2015,
with the terms “Bacillus anthracis” and “heroin”, or “injectional anthrax”. Other than our previously publishedwork
(Price et al., 2012), we found no other relevant studies on elucidating the global phylogenetic relationships of
B. anthracis strains associated with injectional anthrax caused by recreational heroin consumption of spore-
contaminated drug. There were, however, publically available genome sequences of two strains involved (Price
et al., 2012; Grunow et al., 2013) and the draft genome sequence of Bacillus anthracisUR-1, isolated from a German
heroin user (Ruckert et al., 2012) with only limited information on the genotyping of closely related strains (Price
et al., 2012; Grunow et al., 2013).
Lay Person Interpretation: Injectional anthrax has been plaguing heroin drug users across Europe for more than
10 years. In order to better understand this outbreak, we assessed genomic relationships of all available injectional
anthrax strains from four countries spanning aN12 year period. Very fewdifferenceswere identiﬁedusing genome-
based analysis, but these differentiated the isolates into two distinct clusters. This strongly supports a hypothesis ofnetics and Genomics, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff AZ 86011-4073, USA.
. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1614 P. Keim et al. / EBioMedicine 2 (2015) 1613–1618at least two separate anthrax spore contamination events perhaps during the drug production processes. Identiﬁ-
cation of two events would not have been possible from standard epidemiological analysis. These comprehensive
data will be invaluable for classifying future injectional anthrax isolates and for future geographic attribution.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Anthrax is a common disease in livestock and usually only infects
humans that come into contact with infected animals or their products
(Mock & Fouet, 2001). High hygienic standards, knowledge of the dis-
ease, and effective surveillance make human anthrax infections ex-
tremely rare in industrialized countries. Most commonly, human
anthrax presents as a cutaneous lesion due to spore deposition from
handling contaminated animal hair, meat, or skin. The three other rec-
ognized anthrax types are gastrointestinal, inhalational, and injectional
anthrax, which have unique clinical presentations dependent on the in-
fective route. Injectional anthrax (IA), which was only recently recog-
nized, is associated with recreational drug use when Bacillus anthracis
spores have contaminated heroin (Berger et al., 2014). Injectional
drug consumers may have preexisting health issues that exacerbate
their sensitivity to anthrax and victimsmay be reluctant to seekmedical
attention. The presentation of IA can be particularly gruesome with ex-
tensive tissue necrosis emanating from the injection site (Booth et al.,
2010; Russell et al., 2013).
While the ﬁrst case of IA was described in 2000 from Norway
(Ringertz et al., 2000), it is remarkable that no additional cases of IA
were documented over the following 10 years. The largest subsequent
cluster of IA cases occurred in 2009–10 and predominantly centered
in Scotland (Team, 2011). Other more sporadic cases have been
observed in England, Wales, Scotland, Germany, Denmark, and France
in 2012–13 (Hanczaruk et al., 2014). It is clear that not all drug users
consuming a particular batch of heroin have contracted anthrax and
attempts to directly detect or isolate B. anthracis from heroin have failed
(Team, 2011). How andwhy heroinwas contaminated with B. anthracis
spores has been difﬁcult to address due to the illicit nature of the drug,
but likely occurred during its distribution.
B. anthracis evolved as a clonal lineage from a B. cereus-like ancestor
with increased pathogenicity due to the acquisition of two virulence
plasmids and chromosomal mutations (Mock & Fouet, 2001; Okinaka
et al., 1999). The clonal nature of B. anthracis and, perhaps, slow evolu-
tionary rates have resulted in a highly homogeneous species with little
strain-to-strain diversity. Nevertheless, Single Nucleotide Polymor-
phism (SNP) variation has been readily discovered through the use of
whole genome sequencing and the population structure has been de-
ﬁned to a high level at both a local and global scale (Pearson et al.,
2004; Van Ert et al., 2007; Read et al., 2002).
In a previous analysis of the Scottish IA outbreak, a single whole ge-
nome sequence was used to identify clade-speciﬁc SNPs (Price et al.,
2012). Diagnostic assays targeting some of these SNPs clustered all IA
specimens, including those from 2012 (Price et al., 2012; Grunow
et al., 2013), into a single subtype (deﬁned by SNP1173928 and
SNP1053700) nestedwithin a clade that contained two closely afﬁliated
strains from infected humans (Turkey) (Price et al., 2012). Given a
suspected origin in Afghanistan, a major producer of heroin destined
for Western Europe, these results led to the conclusion that the heroin
may have been contaminated along transportation routes through the
Middle East and not at the production source. Importantly, it was dis-
covered that European IA cases could be differentiated by a VNTR allelic
difference, raising questions about the epidemiological signiﬁcance
of the differentiation. However, as only IA strains appeared to be in a
common clade within the comparison group, a single continuing con-
tamination event and persistence of contaminated heroin circulating
in Europe provided the most parsimonious description of this outbreak
(Hanczaruk et al., 2014). Detailed knowledge of heroin productionpractices, transportation, processing, and potential sources of spore con-
tamination is lacking, which makes understanding and controlling IA
challenging. Here,we greatly expandupon our knowledge on the genet-
ic make-up and relationships of IA-associated B. anthracis by analyzing
whole genome sequences (WGS) from 58 newly sequenced isolates
and two published isolates from 36 different IA patients and seven
WGS from phylogenetically afﬁliated strains. We ﬁnd that IA cases
from the years 2000 to 2013 can be clustered into two distinct genetic
groups that overlap in time and space, suggesting distinct contamina-
tion events, albeit with very similar but unique strains of B. anthracis
that likely originated from a common geographic region.
2. Methods
B. anthracis strains. We analyzed the genomes of 67 B. anthracis iso-
lates, including 60 associated with IA cases. Seven additional strains
were not from IA cases but were phylogenetically afﬁliated. The more
distantly related Ames Ancestor is a very high quality ﬁnished genome
and was used as a reference. These strains are listed in Table S1 along
with their original sources and NCBI accession numbers for each WGS.
All isolates represented residualmaterial from clinical diagnostic proce-
dures andwere de-identiﬁed. As such, they are exempt from the human
subjects requirements for patient enrollment.
2.1. DNA Isolation and WGS Generation
B. anthracis isolates from IA cases and the reference strain collections
were cultured on blood agar plates (bioMérieux) and incubated for
16–24 h at 37 °C and then used for DNApuriﬁcation. DNAwas harvested
from single colonies, either directly or following liquid media culturing,
using the QIAamp UCP Pathogen Mini Kit or Blood and Tissue kit
(Qiagen, Valencia, CA) with an enzymatic (lysozyme) or mechanical
pre-lysis step. DNA library preparations for WGS were performed
using standard methods and performed on an Illumina MiSeq instru-
ment (see Supplemental Methods for details).
2.2. SNP Analysis of WGS
Reference genome assemblies were downloaded from GenBank
(Benson et al., 2012). Paired-end reads were aligned against the Ames
Ancestor genome (NC_007530) using BWA-MEM (Li, 2013) and SNPs
were called with the UniﬁedGenotyper method in GATK (DePristo
et al., 2011; McKenna et al., 2010); any SNPs that had a coverage less
than 6X depth and majority allele frequencies b90% were discarded.
The reference (Ames Ancestor) was aligned against itself with NUCmer
(Kurtz et al., 2004) and SNPs that fell into regions that mapped more
than oncewere removed from the analysis. External genome assemblies
were aligned against the Ames Ancestor genome with nucmer and a
direct one-to-one mapping was generated to identify variant as well
as invariant sites (Table S2). All of these methods are wrapped by the
Northern Arizona SNP Pipeline (NASP; https://github.com/TGenNorth/
NASP). Phylogenetic analysis was performed by maximum parsimony
analysis using MEGA 6.0 (Tamura et al., 2013).
2.3. Identifying Close Relatives to the IA Strains
In order to identify close relatives of the B. anthracis IA strains, we
screened two genetically diverse global collections comprising 1293
B. anthracis isolates. This included the historical CDC B. anthracis
1615P. Keim et al. / EBioMedicine 2 (2015) 1613–1618archives (Marston et al., 2005) and the NAU strain collection.We tested
these strains using three published canSNP PCR assays (SNP1530761,
SNP3836105, and SNP1053700), which deﬁne the heroin-associated
strains and their close relatives (Price et al., 2012).
2.4. Molecular Conﬁrmation of Phylogenetic Structure
In order to conﬁrm branches identiﬁed by WGS analysis within the
IA-subclade and close relatives, we developed 31 SNP assays using
methods described by Birdsell et al. (Birdsell et al., 2012). A subset
of these assays was used to screen 60 IA and close relatives strains
(Fig. 1) (Supplemental Table S3). For one additional IA clinical tissue
specimen (P35 A4569) collected from a victim for which no isolate
was available, trace amounts of B. anthracis DNA were detected with
these new SNP-PCR genotyping assays allowing this sample to be phy-
logenetically placed.Wealso used PCR on a subset of samples to conﬁrm
the WGS-based allele analysis of pXO1- and pXO2-VNTR loci allelic
states (Hanczaruk et al., 2014; Van Ert et al., 2007; Keim et al., 2000).
The pXO2 alleles were assigned as a code based on the copy number
of VNTR repeats as described in Grunow et al. (Grunow et al., 2013).
3. Results
3.1. WGS Deﬁned Phylogenetic Relationships
We performedWGS analyses on 58 new and two published isolates
from 36 IA victims to understand how the different cases are epidemio-
logically related. These genomes were generated to a high quality draft
level and compared to seven other closely related strain genomes, as
well as the Ames Ancestor genome as a reference (Fig. 1). The seven
closely related strains were identiﬁed by pre-screening clade speciﬁc
SNPs across the global strain collections (Price et al., 2012). Notably,
four of the non-IA strains also possessed the two SNPs (SNP1173928
and SNP1053700), which had been thought to be speciﬁc for the
heroin-associated strains (Price et al., 2012). Thus, members of the IA
clade themselves are relatively rare as only b0.5% of the 1293 strains
screened were identiﬁed as such.
The IAWGS phylogenetic relationships identify two distinct clusters
(Fig. 1). Whereas 266 SNPs from 1071 total SNPs used in this analysis
were discovered separating the IA subclade from theAmes Ancestor ref-
erence, only 77 parsimony informative (synapomorphic) SNPs wereFig. 1.Whole Genome Phylogenetic Reconstruction of Injectional Anthrax (IA) B. anthracis Isol
dates in parentheses) sampled from 36 IA patients, seven closely related B. anthracis isol
(68 OTUs). Of the 1079 SNPs, 350 synapomorphic SNPs were phylogenetically informative
was only a single homoplastic SNP in this phylogenetic model (CI = 0.997), which did
with the Price et al. (Price et al., 2012) deﬁnition, which was based upon two branch-speciﬁc
IA-Group I and IA-Group II is presented in Fig 2 and Fig S1.found within the IA subclade and six informative SNPs from the near-
neighbor clade. An additional 721 SNPs were on terminal branches
and unique for the corresponding isolate (autapomorphic). Excluding
the long branch to CDC-2000031055, which is likely a mutator strain
due to mutations in the yycJ gene (data not shown), there are 236
autapomorphic SNPs. Sixteen SNPs separate the two IA clusters as well
as an allelic difference at the ‘AT’ repeat sequence of the VNTR locus
on pXO2 (Table S4). The phylogenetic model is highly robust (Pearson
et al., 2009) with only a single homoplasious SNP (4398276) that does
not impact the phylogenetic topology of the IA subclade and results in
an overall tree with a consistency index of 0.997. Price et al. (Price
et al., 2012) reported the close relationship of two Turkish isolates to
the Scottish IA outbreak strains, but we have now identiﬁed additional
ﬁve close phylogenetic relatives that were isolated in the USA; unfortu-
nately the original global sources of these strains are unknown as they
were likely isolated from goods imported into the USA and were
never ecologically established. Three of these seven closely related
strains, including the two Turkish isolates, are basal to the IA subclade
but four others are within this subclade. While the origins of the two
most closely related non-IA strains (CDC-2002721572 and CDC-
2000031055)would provide further details on the potential geographic
source of contamination, these isolates are important for showing that
the IA outbreak is indeed the result of more than one contamination
event.3.2. Phylogenetic Diversity Within Injectional Anthrax Groups
Although the two IA Groups are each dominated by an archetypal
ancestral genome, there are minor variants observed in both (Fig. 2
and S1). Of the 58 new and two published genomes, 49 of these were
members of G-I with 27 matching the predicted ancestral genome and
22 differentiated with derived SNP alleles (1 to 4 SNP differences). Six
pairs of differentiated genotypes were observed among the 22 derived
genomes, resulting in sixteen derived subgroups. The remaining 11 IA
isolates formed G-II, with 6 genomes identical to the ancestral genotype
and 5 genomes differentiated by derived alleles at 1 or 2 SNPs. The
single B. anthracis positive complex clinical sample (P35 A4569) was
phylogenetically placed in G-II by 11 new canSNP assays (Table S3).
Due to a lack ofWGS for A4569, it remains collapsed in the ancestral ge-
notype. In G-II, all genomeswith derived alleleswere singletons (Fig. 2).ates. SNPs discovered from whole genome sequences of 60 B. anthracis isolates (isolation
ates, and one outgroup genome were used to reconstruct phylogenetic relationships
for determining the tree topology. Sixteen SNPs separated the two IA groups. There
not affect the topology. The Injectional Anthrax Subclade is labeled and consistent
SNPs (SNP1173928 and SNP1053700) marked here with an asterisk (*). Variation within
Fig. 2. Phylogenetic Diversity Within the Two Injectional Anthrax Groups. The diversity within each of the two IA groups is represented as dendrograms where the predicted ancestral
genomes are the left vertical lines. Genomes perfectly matching the ancestral allele states are ﬂush with these lines, whereas genomes differing by one or more SNPs have a horizontal
line of the appropriate length. Group I (N= 49) contains 27 strains with genomes identical to the ancestor and 22 strains with genomes that differ from the ancestor, including 16 unique
derived types. Shared SNPs (synapomorphic) identify 6 derived pairs. ForGroup I, independent isolates from the same patient (replicate genomes) are labeled into four different categories
ofwithin single patient diversity. Group II (N=11) has six ancestral genome types and ﬁve genomeswith derived allele states. The single B. anthracis clinical tissue specimen (P35 A4569)
is labeledwith an asterisk (*) andwasnotWGSbut rather analyzedphylogenetically by the 11new canSNP assays (Table S3) and, thus, is collapsed into the ancestral genome. There is only
one incidence of allelic variation within patient replicate isolates for Group II.
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replicates from the same patient showed heterogeneity in seven of
the 12 patients (Fig. 2). The within-patient diversity patterns can be
captured by four categories, including: 1) multiple replicates from a
single patient that are identical to each other aswell as the ancestral ge-
notype, 2) multiple replicates from a single patient that are identical toeach other but differ from the ancestral genotype, 3) multiple replicates
from a single patient that differ from each other as well as from the an-
cestral genotype, and 4) isolates from different patients that differ from
the ancestral genotype but share rare SNP(s) and, for one, are even iden-
tical to each other. Identical replicate genomes commonly matched the
ancestral genome, but there were three patients where duplicate
1617P. Keim et al. / EBioMedicine 2 (2015) 1613–1618isolates were identical but differed by 1 SNP from the ancestral geno-
type (P12, P18, P20). The replicate pair from one other patient (P1) dif-
fered from the ancestral genome by 2 shared SNPs, but also from each
other by 2 additional SNP differences. Three other patients (P7, P14,
P23) had genome pairs with replicates both matching and differing
from the ancestral genotype (differing by 1 or 2 SNPs). All these minor
variants could have been generatedwithin single hosts during the infec-
tions or during subsequent laboratory culturing, but they also could
have preexisted in the contaminated heroin. This scenario of the pres-
ence of pre-infection diversity is supported by the two category 4 exam-
ples that aremost parsimoniously explained by SNP differences existing
among the heroin spores themselves. These two derived genome pairs
differed from the G-I ancestral genotype by a shared SNP but were iso-
lated from different patients (P5/P10 and P12/P22). This argues for het-
erogeneity among the infective spores, as well as for infective doses
sufﬁcient to be detected in small end-point sample sizes and for biolog-
ical diversity to be maintained within a single diseased host despite the
potential for genetic drift.
3.3. Spatial and Temporal Distribution of the Phylogenetic Groups
The two phylogenetic groupswere found in both continental Europe
and the UK (Fig. 3). The large IA outbreak of 2009–10 was focused in
Scotland andmost of G-I isolateswere located there, with the exception
of ﬁve isolates from England and two from Germany. G-II isolates were
distributed across a larger region, including Denmark, England,
Germany, and Scotland. The IA temporal occurrence is exclusively in
the 2009–10 timeframe for the G-I and primarily in 2012–13 for G-II,
with the single exception of the Norwegian 2000 isolate (Grunow
et al., 2013). These spatial patterns must, at least partially, reﬂect the il-
licit drug distribution networks. The temporal patterns probably reﬂect
the timing of spore contamination in drug production and subsequent
drug distribution activities. We attempted to calibrate the phylogenetic
branch lengths to epidemiological dates of isolate, but observed no cor-
relation between the two (Fig S3).
4. Discussion
Understanding the IA outbreak has been difﬁcult because of the
mostly sporadic nature of cases that are restricted to a subset of the pop-
ulation with hidden activities (Berger et al., 2014). Furthermore, efforts
to directly monitor heroin for anthrax spore contamination by culture
or PCR have failed (Booth et al., 2010; Team, 2011). EpidemiologicalFig. 3. Distribution of Heroin-Associated Anthrax Cases in this Study. The location of the
37 IA cases (from which a total of 61 patient isolates were retrieved) is indicated along
with their membership in Group I or II.analyses to identify IA trends using fewer strains andwith lower resolu-
tion molecular subtyping (clade speciﬁc canSNPs and MLVA-31) have
been informative, yet incomplete. In this report, we have increased
our discriminatory power and phylogenetic resolution by increased
sampling of IA cases, screening two large strain collections to identify
other phylogenetically relevant strains, and employingWGS to all rele-
vant isolates.
The assumption that European heroin is produced in Afghanistan
and then smuggled through intervening countries is well founded and
has restricted hypotheses for the source of the IA anthrax spores to
these regions. One use of genome databases is for source attribution,
and in Price et al. (Price et al., 2012), the afﬁliationwith Turkish isolates
fueled speculation that the spore contamination event occurred while
the heroin was transiting through this country. The identiﬁcation of
other isolates in the IA subclade, possibly from other parts of the
world, illustrates the strengths and weakness of this argument and the
necessity for extensive sampling in the suspected geographic region.
Detailed sampling of B. anthracis in Afghanistan and other potential re-
gional smuggling routes within the Middle East is greatly needed for
eliminating and pinpointing likely sources. For most recent molecular
epidemiological investigations, the current databases have been sufﬁ-
cient to identify possible sources, but additional contemporary sam-
pling is needed to differentiate alternative source hypotheses. In this
report, the linkage to the Middle East and Turkey still exists, but new
strains utilized in this study emphasize the uncertainty in attribution
as discussed by Price et al. (Price et al., 2012). These strains are more
closely related to the IA subclade than the Turkish ones, and while
their exact origins are unknown, they emphasize the need to consider
and sample neighboring geographical regions as possible sources.
The phylogenetic and temporal patterns reported here indicate that
at least two spore contamination events occurred. The core genomeSNP
analysis strongly supports the presence of two IA clusters, each ofwhich
is monophyletic and well supported by multiple synapomorphic SNPs.
The phylogenetic presence of other isolates that are spatially and tem-
porally unrelated to IA cases provides further evidence that these are
distinct groups. Even though these non-IA strains probably originated
from the same region as the IA strains, the dates of collection (1957
and 1988) are key to establishing that these isolates are not directly
epidemiologically related to the IA outbreak and thus break apart the
otherwise monophyletic clade of IA strains. The early isolation dates
also demonstrate that strains representing these two clades could
have been affecting human and animal health for decades before
the IA was detected. Because of the lack of temporal calibration for
B. anthracis evolution, we are limited to collection dates to make infer-
ences about the duration of this outbreak. These two IA groups therefore
must have arisen independently. There is also diversity within each
group, suggesting diversity at the source and the possibility of even
more contamination events. It is possible that variation is generated in
a single host infection but some of the phylogenetic patterns shown
here are best explained by diversity generated from several infection cy-
cles and thus contamination of B. anthracis from several hosts. Although
distinct, the two subclades are closely related with only 16 SNPs sepa-
rating them. This level of variation is frequently seen within a single
country (Khmaladze et al., 2014; Simonson et al., 2009; Keneﬁc et al.,
2009) and could be indicative of a close geographic relationship for
the two sources.
Whether each group represents a single contamination or multiple
contaminations from a single source is hard to determine, but a single
contamination event for each group is the simplest explanation. The
temporal pattern of G-I in 2009–1010 and G-II mostly in 2012–13 is
also mostly consistent with separate contamination events aligned
with these outbreaks. The time point associated with the Norwegian
2000 isolate in G-II is most difﬁcult to explain. The distribution of G-II
across N13 years is astounding and difﬁcult to reconcile with a single
contamination event. It has been argued that heroin supply and inven-
tories would not last for 13 years, especially given the apparent
1618 P. Keim et al. / EBioMedicine 2 (2015) 1613–161810-year lapse in G-II IA cases.We therefore suggest that there is a single
contaminating source for the G-II cases but that there have been two or
more (unobserved) contamination events.Acknowledgments
We are very grateful to individuals and institutions that provided
strains for this work. This includes Centers of Disease Control (Atlanta
Georgia USA), Dr. Mehmet Doganay (Erciyes University, Kayseri,
Turkey), Dr. Udo Reischl, and Dr. Thomas Holzmann (University Hospital
Regensburg, Germany), Dr. Mandy Elschner (Friedrich-Loefﬂer-Institut,
Institute of Bacterial Infections and Zoonoses, Jena, Germany), Dr. Anne
Kjerulf and Dr. Jorgen Skov Jensen (both Statens Serum Institut, National
Institute for Health Data and Disease Control, Copenhagen, Denmark)
and Dr. Per Sandven (Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Department
of Bacteriology and Immunology, Oslo, Norway).
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.ebiom.2015.10.004.References
Benson, D.A., Karsch-Mizrachi, I., Clark, K., Lipman, D.J., Ostell, J., Sayers, E.W., 2012.
GenBank. Nucleic Acids Res. 40 (Database issue), D48–D53.
Berger, T., Kassirer, M., Aran, A.A., 2014. Injectional anthrax— new presentation of an old
disease. Euro surveillance: Bulletin Europeen sur les maladies transmissibles =
European Communicable Disease Bulletin. 19.
Birdsell, D.N., Pearson, T., Price, E.P., et al., 2012. Melt analysis of mismatch ampliﬁcation
mutation assays (Melt-MAMA): a functional study of a cost-effective SNP genotyping
assay in bacterial models. PLoS ONE 7 (3), e32866.
Booth, M.G., Hood, J., Brooks, T.J., Hart, A., 2010. Health Protection Scotland Anthrax
Clinical N. Anthrax infection in drug users. Lancet 375 (9723), 1345–1346.
DePristo, M.A., Banks, E., Poplin, R., et al., 2011. A framework for variation discovery and
genotyping using next-generation DNA sequencing data. Nat. Genet. 43 (5), 491–498.
Grunow, R., Klee, S.R., Beyer, W., et al., 2013. Anthrax among heroin users in Europe
possibly caused by same Bacillus anthracis strain since 2000. Euro surveillance:
Bulletin Europeen sur les maladies transmissibles = European Communicable
Disease Bulletin. 18.
Hanczaruk, M., Reischl, U., Holzmann, T., et al., 2014. Injectional anthrax in heroin users,
Europe, 2000–2012. Emerg. Infect. Dis. 20 (2), 322–323.Keim, P., Price, L.B., Klevytska, A.M., et al., 2000. Multiple-locus variable-number tandem
repeat analysis reveals genetic relationships within Bacillus anthracis. J. Bacteriol.
182 (10), 2928–2936.
Keneﬁc, L.J., Pearson, T., Okinaka, R.T., et al., 2009. Pre-Columbian origins for North
American anthrax. PLoS ONE 4 (3), e4813.
Khmaladze, E., Birdsell, D.N., Naumann, A.A., et al., 2014. Phylogeography of Bacillus
anthracis in the country of Georgia shows evidence of population structuring and is
dissimilar to other regional genotypes. PLoS ONE 9 (7), e102651.
Kurtz, S., Phillippy, A., Delcher, A.L., et al., 2004. Versatile and open software for comparing
large genomes. Genome Biol. 5 (2), R12.
Li, H., 2013. Aligning Sequence Reads, Clone Sequences and Assembly Contigs With
BWA-MEM. arXivorg (arXiv:1303.3997 [q-bio.GN]).
Marston, C.K., Hoffmaster, A.R., Wilson, K.E., et al., 2005. Effects of long-term storage on
plasmid stability in Bacillus anthracis. Appl. Environ. Microbiol. 71 (12), 7778–7780.
McKenna, A., Hanna, M., Banks, E., et al., 2010. The genome analysis toolkit: a MapReduce
framework for analyzing next-generation DNA sequencing data. Genome Res. 20 (9),
1297–1303.
Mock, M., Fouet, A., 2001. Anthrax. Annu. Rev. Microbiol. 55, 647–671.
Okinaka, R.T., Cloud, K., Hampton, O., et al., 1999. Sequence and organization of pXO1, the
large Bacillus anthracis plasmid harboring the anthrax toxin genes. J. Bacteriol. 181
(20), 6509–6515.
Pearson, T., Busch, J.D., Ravel, J., et al., 2004. Phylogenetic discovery bias in Bacillus
anthracis using single-nucleotide polymorphisms from whole-genome sequencing.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 101 (37), 13536–13541.
Pearson, T., Okinaka, R.T., Foster, J.T., Keim, P., 2009. Phylogenetic understanding of
clonal populations in an era of whole genome sequencing. Infect. Gen. Evol. J. Mol.
Epidemiol.Evol. Gen. Infect. Dis. 9 (5), 1010–1019.
Price, E.P., Seymour, M.L., Sarovich, D.S., et al., 2012. Molecular epidemiologic investiga-
tion of an anthrax outbreak among heroin users, Europe. Emerg. Infect. Dis. 18 (8),
1307–1313.
Read, T.D., Salzberg, S.L., Pop, M., et al., 2002. Comparative genome sequencing for discov-
ery of novel polymorphisms in Bacillus anthracis. Science 296 (5575), 2028–2033.
Ringertz, S.H., Hoiby, E.A., Jensenius, M., et al., 2000. Injectional anthrax in a heroin skin-
popper. Lancet 356 (9241), 1574–1575.
Ruckert, C., Licht, K., Kalinowski, J., et al., 2012. Draft genome sequence of Bacillus
anthracisUR-1, isolated from a German heroin user. J. Bacteriol. 194 (21), 5997–5998.
Russell, L., Pedersen, M., Jensen, A.V., Soes, L.M., Hansen, A.B., 2013. Two anthrax cases
with soft tissue infection, severe oedema and sepsis in Danish heroin users. BMC
Infect. Dis. 13, 408.
Simonson, T.S., Okinaka, R.T., Wang, B., et al., 2009. Bacillus anthracis in China and its
relationship to worldwide lineages. BMC Microbiol. 9, 71.
Tamura, K., Stecher, G., Peterson, D., Filipski, A., Kumar, S., 2013. MEGA6: Molecular
Evolutionary Genetics Analysis version 6.0. Mol. Biol. Evol. 30 (12), 2725–2729.
Team, N.A.O.C., 2011. An Outbreak of Anthrax Among Drug Users in Scotland, December
2009 to December 2010. Health Protection Scotland, Glasgow, Scotland.
Van Ert, M.N., Easterday, W.R., Huynh, L.Y., et al., 2007. Global genetic population struc-
ture of Bacillus anthracis. PLoS ONE 2 (5), e461.
